

Lacuna Eastern Europe

Scuttlebutting for Value in Emerging Europe

Disclaimer



THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN THIS PRESENTATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE FINANCIAL SERVICES OR INVESTMENT ADVICE. INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION MAY NOT BE ACCURATE OR CURRENT AND MAY BE RENDERED INACCURATE BY CHANGES IN LAW OR REGULATION. NOTHING IN THIS PRESENTATION IS INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE AN OFFER OR RECOMMENDATION TO ACQUIRE OR SELL, OR A SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO ACQUIRE OR SELL, ANY SECURITIES OR FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN RELATION TO MENTIONED SECURITIES.

This information document is intended exclusively for professional investors and semi-professional investors in a sub-fund of Lacuna Investment-AG TGV as well as for professional and semi-professional investors interested in acquiring a share in a sub-fund of Lacuna Investment-AG TGV. The sub-funds of Lacuna Investment-AG TGV are special AIFs pursuant to the German Capital Investment Code (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch) and may not be acquired by private investors within the meaning of § 1 (19) no. 31 of the German Capital Investment Code (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch) nor distributed to private investors.

Table of Contents



- I. Introduction
- II. Why Eastern Europe?
- III. Investment Strategy
- IV. Portfolio Snapshot
- V. Case Studies
- VI. Factsheet & Contact



I. Introduction

Lacuna – 360° View



Entrepreneurial Value Investing

- Our investment style combines a Value Investing DNA with experience gathered from founding and growing the Fronteris Group, Lacuna's parent company.
- We see ourselves as co-owners in businesses we invest in and focus first and foremost on the business and the people running it.
- We believe the academic value-growth dichotomy is mischief:
 - Value Investing ≠ Statistically cheap and / or stagnating companies
 - We invest in undervalued companies with growth potential
- Capital preservation focus with attractive risk-adjusted return potential
 - Minimize the chance for permanent capital loss through the margin of safety principle and acquiring high cashon-cash returns
 - Return Target: 2x MOIC over 5 years, ~15% Return p.a.

Lacuna Funds

Fund	Focus	AUM	ISIN	Inception
Lacuna Global Health+	Global Healthcare Equties	17,8 EURm	LU0247050130	31.03.2006
Lacuna Eastern Europe	Eastern European Equities	3,1m EUR	DE000A3E00L3	01.01.2023
Lacuna Wachstum	Global Equities	16,8 EURm	DE000A141UT0	30.12.2015
Lacuna Ausgewogen	Multi-Asset	11,1 EURm	DE000A141US2	30.12.2015
Lacuna Momentum	Trend- Following	5,8 EURm	DE000A141UU8	30.12.2015

Lacuna – Our People



Leadership



Werner Engelhardt Founder & CIO



Manuel KohlManaging Director

Investment Team



Hendrik KreilingerPortfoliomanager



Marc Bösen Analyst



II. Why Eastern Europe?

Top-Down Thesis



Buoyant Economic Development

- Eastern Europe is amongst the fastergrowing economic regions globally
- Economic Cluster with a +230m population that exhibits GDP/Capita levels with catch-up potential and attractive growth runway
- Low indebtedness and improving fiscal discipline have contributed to increasing economic resilience

Eastern European Equities are Cheap & Out-of-Favor

- Eastern European markets look like an anti-bubble – completely missed out on the latest equity bull market
- Decade+ underperformance and investors chasing returns elsewhere triggering multi-year net outflows and valuation compression
- Market is cheap at 7-8x fwd P/E compared to other equity market regions and isn't valued at cyclical peak earnings or frothy sentiment – Mean-Reversion Potential!

Promising Stock-Picking Environment

- Falling investor interest catalyzed increasing cessation of market coverage by Investment Banks and Sellside Analyst
- Less Analyst Coverage means more frequent price/value mismatches – higher bargain density!?
- Smaller fund size gives us a competitive edge - most professionals that still invest in the region are limited to larger index names that are often low-quality businesses

We believe that **intrinsic value investing** based on diligent fundamental analysis and with an **above-average time horizon** is a **promising approach to take advantage of this opportunity**.


Buoyant Economic Development



Attractive Economic Growth + Improving Economic Stability

Amongst Faster-Growing Economic Clusters


GDP/Capita in USD & IMF Medium-Term Real GDP Est.



Note: Lac Eastern Europe Economies represents median figures for countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey.

+230m Population with GDP/Capita catch-up potential

Population (X-Axis) **vs. GDP/Capita in USD** (Y-Axis)



Source: IMF.


Buoyant Economic Development



Attractive Economic Growth + Improving Economic Stability

EU RRP & MFF Funding a growth tailwind*


Recovery plan as % of GDP



EURm	GDP	RRP grants	MFF 2021-27	% GDP
Poland	574.4	23.9	106.2	23%
Romania	240.2	14.2	51.3	27%
Czech Republic	238.7	7.1	29.7	15%
Greece	182.8	17.8	40.4	32%
Hungary	154.1	7.2	34.5	27%

Source: Eurostat, ec.europa.eu

Source: Wood & Company.



Source: IMF. Lac Eastern Europe Economies represents median figure for countries mentioned on page 9.

^{*} RRP = Resilience & Recovery Plan; MFF = Multiannual Financial Framework.

Out-of-Favor and Cheap Valuation



Decade+ of Underperformance & Ukrainian War → "Ickyness"

Eastern Europe missed out on post-GFC bull market...

Indexed Price Performance (EUR)




Note: The performance of the Eastern European market was adjusted from the beginning of 2022, to mitigate the distorting effect of Russian asset write-downs.

> Nowcasting implies Asset Class is "broken" → Contrarian Buy-Signal

...classic return chasing causes multi-year outflows

Chart 106. EMEA Equity Funds



"when risks and bad news are known to the market and fear is prevalent, it's time to buy what's out of favor, unloved, and *legitimately creating fear."* – Rob Arnott

Out-of-Favor and Cheap Valuation




Reflexivity leading multi-year valuation compression to historic extremes

Cheap Valuation, High Yield

Fwd P/E and P/B 20,0x ■ P/E 23E 15,0x 3,0x (LHS) 10,0x 5,0x 1.0x P/B (RHS) 0.0xLac EE* Emerging Europe North Global World America

Cash on Cash Yield




Note: Data from Citi Market Intelligence; *Lac EE metrics derived from part of universe with existing data – Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Turkey.

Superior Return Potential

7-YEAR ASSET CLASS REAL RETURN FORECASTS*

As of December 31, 2022




Source: GMO

Historically, **low starting valuations** are an indicator of **above-average returns in the long term! Multi-year mean-reversion tailwinds appear likely**, based on historic precedence.


Promising Stock-Picking Environment



Low Sellside Coverage & Gems hiding in less competitive SMID Cap Segment



Less Coverage increases chance to find meaningful undervaluations in Eastern European SMID Caps



Higher quality business models with the ability to convert growth into shareholder returns more prevalent in SMID Caps



III. Investment Strategy


Investment Universe



Universe Methodology


Starting Point:

17 Equity Markets* in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Middle East



^{*} Included Markets: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey.

Geographic Composition



Investment Process Framework



Investment Analysis Lifecycle

Idea Generation

Fundamental Analysis

Valuation Analysis

Decisionmaking & Monitoring

- Organic Idea Generation:
 - Personal Experience
 - Trend Identification
- Inorganic Idea Generation:
 - Buyside Resources
 - Investor Network
 - Industry Experts
 - Sellside -> Less Preferred
- Quantitative Screening:
 - 1st Layer Quality (ROIC, Margin)
 - 2nd Layer Valuation (Yield)
 - "What do I get, What do I pay."
- Toolbox of old ideas/holdings

- Business Model:
 - Understandability & Viability
 - Money Making / Unit Economics
- Industry Structure:
 - Evolution, Relevant Players
 - Cyclical/Structural Trends
 - Entry Barriers / Measuring Moat
- · Channel-Check Interviewing:
 - Suppliers/Customers/Employees
 - Trade Fairs
- · Cap. Allocation, Mgmt. Quality:
 - Quality of Capital Allocation
 - Alignment of incentives

- Greenwald Method:
 - Adj. NAV
 - Steady-State Value
 - Value of Growth

We want growth, but not to pay up Entry Price < Steady-State Value

- Total-Shareholder Return Model Inspired by McKinsey Valuation
- Private-Market- / Peer-Multiples
- Valuation Guardrail: >4% FCF Yield
- Measuring Margin of Safety and calculating adequate Entry Price

- Target Investment Profile:
- Significant Undervaluation
- → Min. 30% Margin of Safety
- Reasonable Business Quality
- Financial Strength
- Honest, aligned, capable operators
- Post-Analysis Trinomial Path:
 - 1) 5Y IRR > 15% Hurdle + Quality- & Returnaccretive to Portfolio = **Buy**
 - 2) 5Y IRR > 15% Hurdle + Business we'd like to own at some point = Watchlist I
 - 3) Not fulfilling 15% Hurdle = Watchlist II
- Monitoring Price/Fundamentals: Portfolio & WL-I Quarterly

Emphasize primary research for an independent as well as evidence-based analysis and formation of an opinion, while benchmarking with secondary research to gauge value triggers and expecations gaps!

Portfolio Construction Framework



Guiding Principles

Fish Where the Fish Are:

- Market segment <500m EUR Market Cap will be main hunting ground.
- Lower competition due to size and liquidity constraints and little analyst coverage makes SMID Caps a fertile ground for mispricings.
- Long-term entrepreneurial success stories take place in SMID Caps.

2. Sophisticated Contrarianism:

- Owning the same things as others won't enable us to achieve aboveaverage investment results in the long run.
- We strive to diverge from the crowd when we are well compensated.

3. Avoid Dumb Mistakes:

 We agree with Ben Graham that Safety of Principal must be #1 priority in investment operations, hence we avoid situations where probability and/or severity of a permanent loss of capital can't be estimated.
 Examples – high leverage, managers lacking integrity, fragile operations.

4. Concentrate, but not excessively:

- Empirical research shows a portfolio of c. 25 unrelated stocks allows to capture most diversification benefits Alpha dilution from #30 onwards.
- We prefer a more concentrated portfolio than most active managers but want at least 20 holdings to mitigate "unknown unknowns".

Portfolio Characteristics

Portfolio Holdings: 20-30

Return Requirement: Min. 15% IRR

Time-Horizon: 3-5 Years

■ Implied Turnover: 20-33%

Cash Management: Residual Opportunity Set

Position Sizing:

At Cost %: 2 / 4 / 6 Max. Position Weight: 10%

Exit Triggers: 1) Fair Value

2) Thesis Broke


3) Better Idea





IV. Portfolio Snapshot

Portfolio Allocation









Portfolio Statistics and Top Holdings



Portfolio Statistics - Median Values

Universe Proxy
2.821
7,4
3,8%

Data from January 31st 2023.

Top Holdings

TIM S.A.	6,9%
AS Ekspress Grupp	5,1%
Krka, d. d.	4,4%
Warsaw Exchange	4,2%
Georgia Capital	4,2%
Hellenic Exchanges	2,5%
Philip Morris CR a.s.	2,0%
Halyk Bank	1,9%
Grupa Pracuj S.A.	1,6%
Kri-Kri Milk Industry S.A.	1,5%

Top 5	24,9%
Top 10	34,4%

^{*}Median Values for Lacuna Eastern Europe.



V. Case Studies



Business Profile

- Ekspress Grupp is the leading media group in the Baltic Countries.
- History traces back to the early post-soviet years and its legacy begins with Eesti Ekspress (#4 Newspaper in Estonia), the first politically independent newspaper in Estonia. The editor-in-chief of Eesti Ekspress was Mr. Hans Luik, who is today Ekspress Grupp's anchor shareholder (73,2%) and became a co-owner of the business in 1991.
- **Mr. Luik built a Baltic media empire** through organic initiatives and M&A in the last 30 years.
- Today, Ekspress Grupp operates iconic internet media portals, magazines, and newspapers, and controls the Baltics' largest digital ads network (Digital Matter).
- Its Delfi media websites are market leaders by users and time spent in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – An audience of 3m Baltic individuals per week.
- Quality of the core media business has historically been underappreciated, as an original presence in low-margin printing services diluted group margins.
- Important Exit from shrinking legacy printing operations in 2021.

EKSPRESS GRUPP


				09.02.2023
CIQ Ticker	TLSE:EEG1T	Share F	rice EUR	1,67
Country	Estonia	x O/Sm		30,3
Industry Group	Media	Marke	t Cap EURm	50,5
Industry	Publishing	Cash &	STI	6,1
# Employees	900	Gross [Debt	-16
Rev/FTE EURk	70,0	EV EUR	m	60,4
Cont. Ops	FY20	FY21	FY22E	FY23E
Sales	43,7	52,1	63,0	63,0
EBITDA	6,6	8,9	8,0	9,0
Margin	15,1%	17,1%	12,7%	14,3%
EV/S	1,4x	1,2x	1,0x	1,0x
EV/EBITDA	9,2x	6.8x	7.6x	6.7x




Owner & Chairman Hans Luik



Revenue Split: Service / Region





Media Ecosystem



Source: AS Ekspress, 2021 Annual Report.



Financial Performance





First Look:


No growth - value trap


Second Look:

No growth due to structural decline in printing. Media is growing and already main profit generator

→ Divestment from Printing is inflection point

Financial Performance – Ex Printing






Ekspress post divestment:


More focused, asset-light, growing


→ more valuable!



While the advent of the internet and the world's shift towards digital was a pain point for many legacy media outlets since the early 2000s, **Ekspress is a textbook example of how to embrace digitalization to improve the strength and durability of a news media business!**









Stock Price Development





Future Growth Opportunities


1) Digital Advertising

Growth Rates Baltic Ad Market vs. AS Ekspress Ad Revenue



- Digital Ads winning market share
 In Estonia from 17% → 49% since 2010
- Company owns "Prime Real Estate" for Digital Ads

2) Digital Subscriptions



- Ongoing switch from print- to digital-contentsubscriptions → ROIC accretive
- 2026 Target: 130% Growth in Subs from FY21 levels
- **Bolt-on M&A** E.g., Geenius, Lrytas.lt



Valuation & Return Potential


 World going digital changed the way media is consumed.

The market bifurcated into "winners" and "losers".

- Companies that lag in terms of digital adoption trade at steep relative discounts to players that lead the digital transformation process - E.g., Schibsted, Alma Media, NY Times.
- Ekspress Grupp's contribution from Digital Revenue is ~80%, which is on par with "Digital Leaders" like Alma Media. Still trades at a +40% Discount to M&A multiples.
- Stock is priced to deliver ~20% 5Y IRR: 10% Norm. FCF Yield + Exp. 5Y FCF CAGR of >10%

Comp. M&A Deals





Source: Deal Multiples from S&P Capital IQ.



Business Profile

- TIM is Poland's largest wholesale distributor of electrical components with a fast-growing third-party logistics business attached to it ("3LP").
- The company was founded in 1987 by two friends Krzystof Folta and Krzysztof Wieczorkowski, who are still involved as CEO and Chairman and control in aggregate 36% of O/S.
- In 2013, TIM decided to revamp its business from being a 25-year-old network of electrical wholesalers into a modern distributor of electrical components. The first mover in seriously pursuing a B2B eCommerce approach in its industry → Better unit economics.
- Sales process has been successfully digitalized over the years. Operates with TIM.pl go-to-platform. Recently mTIM Smartphone-App launched.
- Build-out and success of the logistic services subsidiary is a testament to TIM's entrepreneurial DNA – Infrastructure needed for B2B eCommerce → "making a virtue out of a necessity"!



			09.02.2023
CIQ Ticker	WSE:TIM	Share Price EUR	36,10
Country	Poland	x O/Sm	22,2
Industry Group	Capital Goods	Market Cap PLNm	801,4
Industry	Distributor	Cash & STI	23,2
# Employees	579	Gross Debt	-131,2
Rev/FTE EURk	558,8	EV PLNm	955,8


	FY20	FY21	TTM	FY22E
Sales	1064,9	1314,3	1500,6	1456,0
EBITDA	73,9	142,1	156,5	151,5
Margin	6,9%	10,8%	10,4%	10,4%
EV/S	0,7x	0,5x	0,5x	0,5x
EV/EBITDA	9,4x	4,9x	4,4x	4,6x



Founder & CEO Krzysztof Folta




Sales & EBIT Split



- Distribution remains the core:
 FY21 EBIT contribution of 84%
- Continuing mix shift to 3LP is margin-accretive: EBIT Margin of ~13% in FY21, +20% growth p.a.

Group Financial Performance

TIM Group - Revenues and EBIT Margin, FY13-21




- Switch to B2B eCommerce model improved business quality, drove significant growth and margin improvement
- Sustainable EBIT Margin should be 6-7% -FY21 level is inflated by one-offs (pandemic, PPI inflation)




Distribution – Winning through Scale, Efficiency and Customer-Centricity

- TIM is the largest player in the Polish electro-wholesale industry with a market share of ~12% (Mgmt. comments).
- TIM has been increasing its market share for a decade+, steadily extending its relative scale-linked cost advantage over smaller competitors.
- TIM's approach of centralizing distribution as well as offloading a significant share of the sales process to its online platform allows for better productivity and scalability.
- Competitors largely stuck with the old school wholesaler model – dependent on physical branch networks



Productivity & Sales Network



Source: Illustration on Electro Wholesalers from Alexander Eliasson Write-Up on Grodno. Data on Rev/FTE was gathered from S&P Capital IQ, and Branch Count was gathered from company websites.



-20,0%

Distribution – Winning through Scale, Efficiency and Customer-Centricity

4,0

3,0


2,0

Revenue Indexed

- Economies of Scale and productivity gains improved margins, while the modification of the business model also lowered capital intensity.
- Better working capital efficiency has substantially improved invested capital turnover, supporting improvement in ROTCE to above-industry-average.
 - → Increased FCF Capacity = Higher Intrinsic Value.
- While the company was clearly a Covid-winner, the number of online users and engagement has remained stable in 2022.
 → TIM's approach seems to offer sustainable customer value!

TIM Revenue, Working Capital Efficiency & ROTCE 40,0% 30,0% 20,0% 10,0% -10,0%

NWC Indexed NWC % Sales



Source: TIM SA 3Q22 Earnings Presentation.



3LP – Riding the eCommerce growth trend

- 3LP is one of the largest full-service fulfillment players in Poland
- There are 10-15 companies that are fulfillment pureplays, while ~60 companies have partial coverage of the fulfillment service value chain. Industry structure is fragmented and determined to consolidate once the current phase of high industry growth tapers off.
- Typical clients are predominantly SMEs without the scale or funds that a build-out of an internal fulfillment infrastructure reasonable. TIM also has two larger clients with IKEA Poland and Oponeo.pl, which suggests that 3LP is a relevant address in its industry.
- Continued high growth of Polish eCommerce should be a tailwind for warehouse space and fulfillment demand
 → 3LP is in the process of doubling its capacity until 2024

Revenue, Warehouse Space, Rev/Sqm (PLNm/k)



Fulfillment Revenue, % External Business





Stock Price Development






Valuation & Return Potential

- Stock is cheap on an absolute and relative level:
 - ~7x fwd EV/EBIT and ~9x fwd P/E are undemanding considered in the context of solid business quality and 7-10% p.a. growth potential
 - Triangulating a fair value based on Peer EV/EBIT vs. ROTCE implies +80% upside
- FY26 Revenue Target of PLN 3bn:
 Our Base Case (FY26) Rev 1,9bn, 6% EBIT Margin, 10x
 EV/EBIT Exit Multiple
 → +60 PLN Stock, +70% Upside ex Dividends
- Potential 3LP IPO as catalyst for further valueunlocking in the future

Peer Group Valuation

Distributors – Relative Valuation vs. Quality



Note: Data from S&P Capital IQ, Sample including 28 global publicly listed distributor stocks. TIM's EV/EBIT is based on TTM instead of the 5Y Average. The exercise aims to gauge where a company with comparable economics should be valued at. Norm. ROTCE uses a 5Y avg. EBIT Margin for computation.



VI. Factsheet & Contact

Factsheet & Contact



	Factsheet
Name	Lacuna Eastern Europe TGV
WKN / ISIN	DE000A3E00L3
Fund Category	AIF, § 282 KAGB
Investment Universe / Focus	Global Equities / Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, MENA
Investment Strategy	Active, Bottom-up Selection
Benchmark	Benchmark-free
Fund Advisor / Manager	Lacuna Vermögen GmbH / Hendrik Kreilinger
Auditor	Grant Thornton, Düsseldorf
Inception Date	30.12.2022
Currency	EUR
Total Net Assets (31.01.2023)	3.071.040 €
Initial Price	1.000,00 €
NAV per Share (31.01.2023)	1.023,68 €
Qualified Investors	Professional, Semi-Professional*
Subscription Cycle	Quarterly
Min. Subscription	200.000 €
Redemption	Quarterly
Exit Fee	1%, if holding period < 3 years
Fiscal-year end	30.06.2023
Profit Allocation	Accumulating**
TER (running costs)	1,3%
Management Fee	1,0%
Performance Fee	10% p.a. (High Watermark)

Contact



Hendrik Kreilinger Portfoliomanager



Kreilinger@lacuna.de



+49 941/69 92 60



Manuel Kohl Managing Director



Kohl@lacuna.de



+49 941/69 92 60